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Development Shadows: The Afterlife of 
Collapsed Development Projects in the 
Zambian Copperbelt
Lynn Schler and Yonatan N. Gez
Abstract: Communities that were once the target of postcolonial develop-
ment schemes still contend with the legacies of these interventions, long 
after such projects have been abandoned. This article looks at the afterlife 
of Israeli-led agricultural cooperatives that were initiated in the Zambian 
Copperbelt during the 1960s. Although these schemes collapsed in the 
decade following their establishment, local communities are still coping 
with the history of their rise and fall. In the Kafubu Block and Kafulafuta, 
the physical, social, and economic landscapes resonate with the successes 
and failures of this modernist planning. The schemes continue to provide a 
fundamental and contentious point of reference in both individual and 
community lives. A long-term perspective on the communities’ continued 
engagement with the legacies of the abandoned schemes deepens our under-
standing of development’s complex “afterlife,” and demonstrates how the 
past retains its relevance by taking on different meanings over time. 
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Introduction
In 1966, two years after achieving independence from British colonial-
ism, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia invited Israeli planners to 
establish a series of cooperative settlements in the Copperbelt region. 
The Israeli-led schemes were to play a key role in an ambitious pro-
gramme for promoting rural development, based on Kaunda’s vision for 
democratic socialism known as “humanism.” The Israelis were given 
control over two settlements, the Kafubu Block and Kafulafuta, which 
they reorganised into a type of cooperative called a moshav, based on a 
model that had already been applied successfully in Israel itself.  
After overcoming certain initial challenges in the first few years, the 
schemes gradually began to generate surpluses. From 1970 until 1973, 
agricultural yield and poultry as well as dairy production bore impressive 
results, and the Zambian moshav farmers’ gross income grew to five times 
the national average. Kaunda lavishly praised the work of the Israeli 
experts, and made plans to expand the schemes to other regions of the 
country. However, these initiatives were never realised because in 1973, 
in the aftermath of the October War between Israel and its neighbours, 
Kaunda broke off relations with Israel and ordered the expulsion of its 
experts within weeks. The planners and advisors left the Kafubu Block 
and Kafulafuta with their financial resources and know-how, creating a 
vacuum of expertise. The local farmers failed to run the cooperatives 
without Israeli technical assistance, and the projects fell into ruin as 
debts mounted, funds disappeared, and banks repossessed equipment. 
By the end of 1976, both the Kafubu Block and Kafulafuta cooperatives 
had collapsed – and the settlers who remained on-site were left to re-
assemble their lives in the shadow of the projects’ unfulfilled promises. 
The moshavim (plural of moshav) schemes in Zambia reflected the 
strategies and techniques that gave birth to large-scale, state-initiated 
modernisation initiatives across the continent in the early years of inde-
pendence (Bloom, Miescher, and Manuh 2014: 2). According to Hintzen, 
the “quest for development” led modernising political elites to imple-
ment projects that were aimed at both improving material circumstances 
and at controlling, regulating, and directing the evolution of “underde-
veloped” populations towards “progress” (Hintzen 2014: 27–28). These 
authoritarian initiatives sought – but largely failed – to cast local envir-
onments in the image of modernist ideologies, often with catastrophic 
consequences for local populations. This top-down developmentalist 
approach has since fallen out of favour; as Bonneuil wrote: 
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Planned-development schemes of the golden age of the develop-
mentalist era are now seen as monsters, as mammoth projects that 
resulted in economic, environmental, and social failures. (Bonneuil 
2000: 280) 
While recent years have seen patterns of a shift away from top-down 
development, the legacy of modernist era planning is still present in the 
communities that once served as its laboratories. Postcolonial develop-
ment schemes still resonate for individuals and communities who re-
mained on-site long after the projects themselves ceased to operate, and 
the legacies of these continue to find expression in local initiatives and 
aspirations. 
This article1 looks at the ways in which the shadow of past devel-
opmentalist promises still looms over the former moshav settlements in 
the Zambian Copperbelt. As we will show, despite the 45 years that have 
elapsed, the rise and fall of the moshavim in the Kafubu Block and Kafula-
futa continues to preoccupy the communities that inhabit the former 
schemes – and to resonate in their physical, social, and economic land-
scapes too. The schemes provide a fundamental and contentious point 
of reference in both individual and community lives, thus drawing our 
attention to the long-term consequences of development initiatives. We 
seek to make the case for widening the scholarly vision to those commu-
nities and individuals who continue to occupy the spaces of former pro-
jects. The continual efforts of these communities to reclaim the legacies 
of the abandoned schemes contributes to our understanding of devel-
opment’s complex “afterlife,” and demonstrates that the successes and 
the mishaps of the past take on different meanings over time. Our aim is 
to show that a failed development scheme can have a resilient afterlife, 
one that is shaped both by the project’s specific history and also through 
an ongoing dialogue with political, economic, and social circumstances as 
they have continued to evolve long after the schemes themselves have 
been dismantled. 
 
1 Funding for this research was provided by the Israel Science Foundation, 
Individual Research Grant #540/14. The authors would like to thank Louise 
Bethlehem for helpful critiques of an earlier version of this article. We also 
thank the anonymous reviewers and editors of Africa Spectrum for their useful 
feedback.  
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Conceptualising the Afterlife of Development 
Projects
Within the field of international development and aid, recent years have 
seen a “trend of ‘admitting failure’” (Jones et al. 2013: 8). This long-
overdue movement reflects mounting evidence of botched efforts, as 
well as a painful reality on the ground (1996). A 2011 McKinsey-Devex 
survey discovered that 64 per cent of donor-funded development pro-
jects fail to produce the intended impact for their beneficiaries, while the 
World Bank admitted that, up until 2000, over 50 per cent of its projects 
in Africa had failed (Hekala 2012; Lovegrove, Gebre, and Kumar 2011; 
Ika, Diallo, and Thuillier 2012: 105). In light of this, Ferguson and 
Lohmann go so far as to suggest that rather than asking how develop-
ment has helped the poor, we should ask: “What do aid programmes do 
besides fail to help poor people?” (Ferguson and Lohmann 1994: 180). 
This “implicit acknowledgment that development has failed to fulÀll 
its self-proclaimed mission” (Shrestha 2008: 467) has been a key trigger 
for a critical process of overhauling development thought and practice, 
including shifts from top-down decision-making to more participatory 
approaches. Attempts to fundamentally rethink development are vital 
when we consider the millions of lives that have been affected by failed 
schemes, and the enormous resources that have been wasted as practi-
tioners try to “get development right” (Krueger 2009: 238). But the quest 
to understand what has gone wrong with international development has 
unearthed immense complexity and subsequent confusion with regard to 
the definitions of failure and success, a binary vision that obscures as 
much as it clarifies (Obeng-Odoom 2013). Indeed, we are reminded that 
development projects are multidimensional endeavours and that “[m]ost 
interventions, at any level, will involve some elements of both success 
and failure rather than being one or the other outright” (Jones et al. 
2013: 1).  
Moreover, while development discourse is often cast in teleological 
terms as an inevitable, unidirectional, and triumphalist progress towards 
some abstract modernity, in reality the process of socio-economic trans-
formation may oscillate in all directions – and, indeed, is fragile and re-
versible (Ferguson 1999; Shrestha 2008). Yet a further complication 
emerges when we consider the common gaps between perspectives held 
among policymakers, development workers, and beneficiaries, all along 
what Thomas Bierschenk (2014) has called the “policy chain” of each 
scheme. Jones et al. (2013) – evoking Robert Chambers’s (1997) question 
“whose reality counts?” – remind us that a project may be perceived as a 
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success by donors and implementers but recognised as a failure by its 
intended beneficiaries, or vice versa. Lastly, we must be aware that social, 
economic, and political landscapes are forever shifting, and carry with 
them changes that affect the very conceptions of success and failure 
(Kumar and Corbridge 2002). 
Instead of dwelling on clear-cut categories of success and failure, a 
subtler approach would be to take a broad view of project outcomes so 
as to include short- and long-term impacts – intended and unintended – 
as well as their desirability among individual and collective beneficiaries 
(Munns and Bjeirmi 1996; Ika 2015; Dvir et al. 1998). Such a perspective 
would also seek to understand how even though development projects – 
“interventions” in the full sense of the term – seek to ignite transforma-
tive processes within their host communities, in actuality they may pro-
duce secondary consequences that turn out to be no less far-reaching 
than the project’s objectives (Schuller 2007). Such unforeseeable poten-
tial project outcomes are not limited to failed ones, and even “when the 
project does succeed in improving the context, it changes it in ways that 
could not have been expected” (Ika and Donnelly 2017: 45). Indeed, 
some projects that were deemed successful have had unintended nega-
tive effects, for example on tropical forests (Hayter 2013) or on the leg-
acy of nomadic ways of life (Gronemeyer 1988). Moreover, what may 
seem like the failure or impotence of schemes in the short term may 
result in unintentional outcomes in the long run – and, “even a ‘failed’ 
development project can bring about powerful structural changes” 
(Ferguson 1990: 275). Thus, much can be gleaned from how local com-
munities experience, respond to, and repurpose the remains of develop-
ment initiatives long after the project’s assessment team has handed in its 
final report. 
A longue durée perspective can help to improve development practice, 
as one of the roots of failure has been the disregard for history among 
planners and practitioners (Hodge 2016). Historians have indeed provid-
ed vital perspectives on the reasons for failure among colonial and post-
colonial development schemes (Cooper and Packard 1997). Recent con-
tributions draw our attention to the central role of local actors, who 
influence actual outcomes by exercising agency and organise around their 
interests while resisting unwanted interventions (Van Beusekom and 
Hodgson 2000). As Cooper (1997) argues, across Africa, historically, 
political leadership, trade unionists, communities, and individuals alike 
engaged actively with the concept of development and seized upon the 
vision of reform in order to impose their own agendas. Hunter’s (2014) 
work, meanwhile, has shown how public discourse around the concept 
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of development in colonial Tanganyika constantly evolved, revealing an 
ongoing engagement and questioning of norms and policies associated 
with it within local society. Histories of development have emphasised 
complex and contradictory roles therein for local communities who, as 
Isaacman and Isaacman (2013) argue, can be both victims and agents of it. 
But while development is now increasingly drawing the attention of 
historians, current historiography still does not reveal sufficient engage-
ment as yet with what we call the “afterlife” of development projects. 
More research is needed to understand how local imaginaries, initiatives, 
and criticisms play a role in shaping and employing the legacy of schemes 
long after they have completed their formal lifespan. Such reflections 
bear particular consequences for those communities that still occupy the 
physical and mental spaces of abandoned initiatives, and fall under their 
long shadow. In what follows, we will see how local residents continue 
to dialogue with the history of the Zambian moshav schemes – reconciling 
and repurposing its potent legacies 45 years and more after these projects 
have been dismantled. 
Prelude to Collapse: The Israeli Moshavim in 
the Zambian Copperbelt
Kenneth Kaunda developed a philosophy and a vision for postcolonial 
Zambia that, as noted, he called “humanism.” Declared the Zambian 
national philosophy in 1967, humanism was to form the foundation of 
Zambia’s national identity and the blueprint for the country’s economic 
development (Stevinson 1985). The ideology reflected a blending of 
socialist, Christian, and traditional values, and while Kaunda insisted that 
it was a home-grown philosophy based on traditional modes of thought 
it in fact shared many similarities to the African socialism that found 
expression elsewhere on the continent in the postcolonial years. As an 
integral part of his humanist vision for development, Kaunda promoted 
the establishment of cooperatives – claiming that this signified a return 
to a way of life in which “the people are used to doing things communal-
ly” (quoted in Bowman 2011: 208). 
In 1965, under Kaunda’s leadership, the Zambian government 
launched a programme for establishing state-sponsored cooperatives 
(Albinson 2002: 23). Through an initiative known as the “Chifubu Ap-
peal,” the Department of Mines and Cooperatives offered cash incen-
tives to those who cleared land and formed agricultural cooperatives. 
Thousands seized the opportunity, and by 1968 there were 609 registered 
farming cooperatives – with a total membership of 11,500 farmers. Sev-
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eral scholars have critiqued the hasty rolling out of this programme and 
the massive waste that it engendered (Scott 1978; Bowman 2011; Macola 
2010; Siddle 1970). Most of those who established cooperatives were 
drawn to the government subsidies and loans being offered, and very 
few had an actual commitment to socialism or knowledge of running a 
cooperative (Lombard 1971: 18; Quick 1978: 50–51). The government, 
on its part, funnelled immense funds into cooperatives without provid-
ing the necessary oversight or supervision (Quick 1978: 4). French 
agronomist René Dumont, who conducted a review of Zambian cooper-
atives in 1967, found that peasants were unprepared to maintain the 
initiatives – concluding that,  
it would be rash to say that the African peasants want to move 
towards socialism, because first they have to have a clearer idea of 
what it is. (Dumont and Mazoyer 1973: 135)  
The failure of Kaunda’s cooperative appeal had far-reaching political 
implications, ones that resonated beyond the failed schemes themselves 
(Gordon 2012). As Larmer and Macola (2007) have argued, the failure 
fomented discontent among the local population – who blamed the 
government for not delivering on its post-independence promises. For 
Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP), mean-
while, the high stakes of developmentalism undoubtedly influenced the 
decision to accept Israel’s offer of assistance.  
The Israeli government had made overtures to Zambia on the eve 
of its independence, sending a delegation to Lusaka to lay the ground-
work for establishing diplomatic relations in early 1964 (Israel National 
Archives (hereafter INA) Zambia General 1926/4). This was part of a 
broader history of Israeli state-led involvement in Africa during the 
1960s. Through its national aid agency, MASHAV, Israel hoped to 
strengthen ties with newly independent states and offset the diplomatic 
isolation resulting from the Arab–Israeli conflict (Oded 2013). 
MASHAV offered a wide array of technical assistance and training pro-
grammes to African nations, including schemes in agriculture, irrigation, 
regional planning, community development, healthcare, and organised 
youth movements. Between 1958–1971, tens of thousands of Africans 
were trained in MASHAV courses both in Africa and Israel, and over 
2,700 Israeli technical experts were sent to provide assistance in local 
projects (Peters 1992). 
Within the framework of this broader outreach, Israel offered assis-
tance to Kaunda’s cooperative initiative. Facing the pending failure of 
the Chifubu Appeal, Kaunda was eager to benefit from Israel’s proven 
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record of success in cooperative development (Schler 2018). Zambian 
officials claimed that Israel had earned “a world wide reputation in the 
field” (Zambia National Archive (hereafter ZNA) NCDP 2/3/2 Aid 
Israel memorandum of vice president n.d.). and accepted that country’s 
offer to send technical advisors to support Zambian cooperatives. The 
first group of experts arrived in Lusaka in 1966, and were immediately 
given control over several struggling settlements situated both outside 
Lusaka and in the Copperbelt region (see Yadin 1969). The experts pro-
posed transforming these settlements according to the moshav model, 
which would require a shift from communal farming to cooperatives 
based on smallholders. Farmers and their families would be given indi-
vidual plots, but the entire settlement would operate as a cooperative 
union that oversaw equipment, investments, and marketing. This shift, 
the Israeli advisors argued, would encourage personal initiative among 
the farmers, who lacked such motivation under the communal system 
(Yadin 1969: 29). 
These changes eventually led to improved outputs in all the settle-
ments, but the projects in the Copperbelt in particular became the centre-
piece of Israeli technical expertise. The Department of Mines and Co-
operatives entrusted the Israelis with the task of planning and imple-
menting Kafulafuta, a large-scale settlement block south of the town of 
Luanshya, and also requested that the Israelis take control over the Ka-
fubu Block, an existing settlement scheme that was hastily established by 
the government in 1966 and which suffered from inadequate planning 
and insufficient investment. The Kafubu Block’s early settlers were 
drawn from among the unemployed in the nearby mining cities, and 
came to Kafubu following government promises of resources and train-
ing that were ultimately never actually provided (Yadin 1969: 35). Settlers 
faced many hardships and struggles as they lacked experience in cooper-
ative farming, and had to contend with poor soil and an inadequate water 
supply (Yadin 1969: 4). The Department of Mines and Cooperatives 
offered little assistance, and by the time the Israelis arrived many of the 
first settlers had already abandoned the area and the project was near 
collapse (Schwartz and Hare 2000). 
The Israelis immediately restructured the Kafubu Block and took 
control over marketing and financing, and also began planning Kafulafu-
ta. Both settlements – including the arrangement of villages, homesteads, 
houses, roads, fields, infrastructure, and communal institutions – were 
designed using ready-made blueprints from the Lachish regional model, 
which Israel had implemented at home in the 1950s (Schwartz 2002: 51). 
The settlers – peaking in number at about 200 in each scheme – were 
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given individual plots to farm with their families instead of the commu-
nal fields. Poultry and dairy sectors were established, new crop varieties 
were introduced, and cultivation was expanded. These changes began to 
bear fruits in the second year, as the individual holders started to gener-
ate surpluses. The poultry sector was particularly successful, expanding 
rapidly to become the showcase project of the entire Kafubu Block 
(Yadin 1969: 40–41).  
Production was so great that in 1971, the Israelis made an urgent 
appeal to find consumers for the surplus of six million eggs; this allowed 
Kaunda to boast that he had fulfilled his post-independence promise to 
provide each citizen with one egg a day (Schwartz 2002: 94). The Kafula-
futa settlement block experienced similar success and, despite some 
difficulties with stumping, by 1968 thousands of acres were cleared for 
vegetable cultivation – while pig and poultry farming were also intro-
duced (Schwartz 2002: 89). From 1970 to 1973 production gradually 
increased within both Copperbelt settlements while farmers’ gross per 
capita income reached ZMK 130 per annum, as compared to the nation-
al rural average income of ZMK 26 per annum (Schwartz 2002: 91). 
Israeli advisors closely supervised the agricultural production at each 
settlement, controlled the marketing of surpluses, and oversaw the entire 
financial management of the cooperative unions.  
It is clear that massive Israeli investment and oversight contributed 
to the success of these moshav projects, but this did not prevent the 
Zambian government from drawing up plans to extend their implemen-
tation to other regions (ZNA NCDP/213/11 External Aid Policy, Israel, 
minutes of a meeting 29 July 1969). Following a 1968 national review of 
productivity, the government announced plans to reorganise all agricul-
tural cooperatives according to the principles of the smallholder moshav 
model (Quick 1978: 112). Kaunda praised the work of the Israeli experts 
in no uncertain terms both publicly and privately, telling the Israeli am-
bassador in 1968 that “only the cooperatives in which the Israelis are 
involved are worthy of their name” (INA 4191/36). In a 1971 Observer 
article entitled “African Kibbutz,” Kaunda proclaimed that:  
These settlements are the pride of our nation. If we can duplicate 
these experiments in all the other districts of Zambia, we will be 
on our way to establishing a self-sustaining economy. (The Observer
1971)  
In another interview that year, Kaunda described the Israeli-led initia-
tives as  
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an achievement which deserves the admiration of the country as a 
whole […] here we maybe be pretty close to the answer to grass-
roots development for which we have been searching since inde-
pendence. (Quoted in Amir 1974: 32)  
The Israeli-led projects became the showcase for Kaunda’s cooperative 
initiative, and the Foreign Ministry regularly brought visiting statesmen 
and dignitaries to see the projects first-hand.  
However, these plans never actually came to fruition. Following the 
October War of 1973, Kaunda fell in line with an OAU directive man-
dating member states to sever ties with Israel (Schwartz and Hare 2000: 
97; for an in-depth examination of why Kaunda abandoned these suc-
cessful schemes, see Schler 2018). Kaunda’s decision took the Israelis by 
complete surprise, and advisors and planners working in the moshav 
schemes were directed to leave within weeks. Without Israeli assistance, 
the moshav farmers were no longer able to secure loans at local banks and 
also lacked the necessary resources to maintain the expensive equipment 
required in the poultry and dairy sectors. Soon after the Israelis left, in-
fighting erupted between cooperative members in the scramble for re-
sources. Within a few months equipment was repossessed by the banks, 
and farmers in both schemes found themselves faced with growing debts 
and no possibilities for securing investment. By the end of 1976, both 
the Kafubu Block and Kafulafuta cooperatives had completely collapsed. 
Member of Parliament Valentine Cafoya bemoaned the downfall of one 
of the government’s proudest initiatives:  
Flourishing farms and gardens have been reduced to arid wilder-
ness, and proud villagers, formerly self-sufficient, are now cutting 
down timber and destroying valuable natural resources in order to 
eke out a livelihood. (Times of Zambia 1976) 
Revisiting the Afterlife of the Zambian Moshavim
Thousands of communities in Africa have been the target of develop-
ment schemes that ultimately failed to meet stated objectives; yet, the 
long-term significance of project collapse has hitherto not received 
enough scholarly attention. The Israel-run moshav schemes in the Cop-
perbelt were facilitated as top-down initiatives that succeeded in the 
short term due largely to Israeli investment and oversight. The quick 
collapse of the programmes following the dismissal of these experts 
confirms that after seven years of Israeli assistance the schemes still had 
not achieved sustainability. While top-down interventions such as these 
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have been largely dismissed by practitioners and planners, the local 
communities that remained on-site in the moshavim in the Copperbelt 
currently articulate a more complex and sympathetic set of narratives 
around these initiatives. In what follows, we draw on a visit to the Ka-
fubu Block and Kafulafuta in September 2015; we conducted interviews 
with residents and community leaders, surveyed the physical remains of 
the former schemes, and participated in community meetings and events. 
Our findings reveal that while the moshav schemes collapsed some four 
decades earlier, their presence lingers on in the physical space, collective 
memory, and in current economic and social initiatives too. We will 
examine the various ways in which the legacy of the moshavim still finds 
expression, and suggest the reasons why the short-lived, unsustained 
initiatives still resonate among the communities of the Kafubu Block and 
Kafulafuta.  
The Physical Legacy
According to the original planning of both Kafulafuta and Kafubu 
Block, settlers were grouped into three villages consisting of homesteads 
arranged into equal-sized plots upon which uniform housing was built. 
Houses were set slightly off from the road, and fruit trees were planted 
around them. Each homestead consisted of two acres that were to be 
used for vegetable farming, and on the outskirts of the village each fami-
ly was allocated a second, larger plot for additional agricultural produc-
tion. Villages were grouped as satellites around a regional service centre 
that was comprised of cooperative offices, supply and other stores, 
maintenance and equipment sheds, health centres, educational institu-
tions, a community centre, sports facilities, and a bus stop. Plans man-
dated that no house should be more than 0.3 miles from the regional 
centre, so as to allow villagers easy daily access to the services that they 
needed (The Kafulafuta and Kafubu Cooperative Settlement Projects 
1970).  
Today, despite the passage of time, the spatial layout and built envir-
onment of both the Kafubu Block and Kafulafuta are still replete with 
evidence of Israeli planning. Houses built according to specifications 
mandated by the original plan are still in use, although extensions have 
been added on to some. The mango trees planted next to each house 
have grown tall in the 50 years since they were planted, providing shade 
and fruit to residents both old and new. While the regional centre – par-
ticularly within the Kafubu Block – has grown and expanded beyond the 
original site, the satellite villages still largely consist of the homesteads 
built in the Israeli era, with few additions. 
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The lasting signs and remnants of Israeli planning in these settle-
ments serve as poignant testimony to the broader context of Zambian 
history since the 1970s – the sharp economic downturn that Zambia 
experienced soon after the Israeli-led schemes were abandoned, and the 
decades of stagnation that then followed. Zambia entered independence 
with great economic promise, being classified as a middle-income coun-
try with one of the highest gross domestic products in Africa (Fraser 
2010: 6). However this strong standing disguised substantial economic 
vulnerability, as Zambia was almost exclusively dependent on the export 
of copper – resulting in the country’s acute susceptibility to fluctuations 
in the global market.  
Kaunda and the UNIP’s first decade of rule was characterised by 
confident spending in many areas of social welfare, and investment in 
ambitious schemes such as the Israeli moshavim. The weaknesses of Zam-
bia’s economy were eventually exposed by the global oil crises of 1973 
and 1979, which led to sharp declines in the price of copper – dragging 
Zambia into an economic slump that would last for some 30 years 
(Fraser 2010: 9). The collapse of the country’s terms of trade led to a 
severe debt crisis, and Zambia was finally pushed by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund into implementing economic liberalisa-
tion in the form of structural adjustment programmes. This led to more 
cuts in state wages and jobs, and Zambians suffered from widespread 
deprivation (Fraser 2010: 9–10). Ferguson’s book, Expectations of Moderni-
ty, offers an “ethnography of decline” (1999: 1) that describes the mul-
tiple strategies that Zambians employed throughout this prolonged 
downturn to cope both with the stagnation and with their own dis-
illusionment. Ferguson argues that the deep despair that overtook Zam-
bia during the years of decline was directly linked to the expectations that 
modernist imaginaries of the first decade of independence had nour-
ished. Ambitious schemes such as the Israeli moshav settlements had 
captured local imaginations, and their collapse hit Zambians with an 
irrecoverable sense of loss (Ferguson 1999: 4–12). 
A visit to what remains today of the Israeli moshav schemes in the 
Kafubu Block and Kafulafuta brings this painful history into sharp fo-
cus. The lack of broad-scale changes to the original scheme is a window 
through which to peer into the stagnation that has plagued Zambia for 
decades now. In the eyes of the former moshav settlers, the remnants of 
the Israeli-led projects are a constant reminder of a bygone era of 
productivity and visionary optimism that is still remembered by many 
amid the prevailing absence of new opportunities that has since taken 
hold. While modernist planning of the postcolonial era was to be largely 
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rejected in later years, current residents of the physical remains of this 
top-down planning scheme lament, in the words of Piot, “their point of 
entry into the modern and the global” (2010: 162). The end of modernist 
development meant the loss of foreign investment, the disappearance of 
technical advisors, and the absence of a bold vision that would drive 
change. During our visit, former settlers from the moshavim era insisted 
on showing us the decayed remains of the modernist planning – rusted 
and broken pipes that once brought running water into each home, the 
corroded equipment that lays to waste in the dilapidated storage sheds, 
bare foundations where buildings once stood, and malfunctioning water 
pumps that have since never been repaired (Figures 1–3). 
Figure 1. Broken Down Equipment
© Schler and Gez.
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Figure 2. Former Storage Hanger
 
© Schler and Gez.
Figure 3. Building Remains
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Perhaps nowhere was the sense of stagnation more apparent than in the 
area that began as the regional centre for the Kafubu Block. Structures 
built around the old village square are still standing, and community 
meetings still conducted in the former administrative buildings. Small 
shops still operate, although they now sell mobile airtime and palm wine 
rather than farm equipment (Figure 4). Former settlers took us around 
the remains of the structures built by the Israelis, bemoaning the disre-
pair. Some of this former project infrastructure has been repurposed; 
this was the case, for example, with the bus stop originally built at the 
Kafubu Block village centre. It still stands in the centre of the village 
square, although there is no road running through the Kafubu Block – 
and certainly no buses do either. But the structure is still in use, serving 
as a central point of reference, a meeting point, and also just a shaded 
spot to sit in (Figure 4). This combination of material durability along-
side renovation and reinvention echoes Straube’s work (2018) examining 
similar processes of “reimagining” with regard to communal structures 
throughout the Copperbelt following the onset of economic decline. 
Figure 4. Former Bus Stop in the Kafubu Block
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Memory and the Moshavim Legacy
Similarly to physical space, the imprint of the former moshav schemes 
lives on in both the individual and collective memory – evolving and 
taking on new meaning with every change that occurs in the surrounding 
economic, political, and social circumstances. Interviews with former 
moshav settlers reveal a deep well of detailed recollections related to the 
projects, their demise, and the aftermath. Equally noteworthy was the 
inculcation of these memories into those too young to have partaken 
themselves in the schemes, or who moved to the area only after 1973. 
For practically everyone we spoke to at both the Kafubu Block and Ka-
fulafuta, the moshavim era was a founding moment, a reminder of what 
should have been, and a key navigation tool for charting the way forward 
too. These romanticised memories of the schemes belied their history of 
collapse and unfulfilled promise, and they must be understood within the 
broader context of the Copperbelt’s history.  
At the same time, the afterlife of the moshav schemes also reflected 
aspirations for the future. As will be seen, the arrival of two Israeli re-
searchers inquiring about the former schemes created an opportunity for 
community members to both reckon with the past and to mobilise that 
reckoning for the future. Community members in Kafubu Block and 
Kafulafuta seized upon our meetings to offer their respective interpreta-
tions of the collapsed initiatives, and these reflections wove together 
memories of their engagement with projects and the decades of decline 
that followed. It was clear that community members also hoped our 
interest in the former moshavim would ultimately lead to new Israeli 
schemes. The longing for a return to an era of investment and planning 
was present in the question posed to us again and again in meetings with 
local residents: “Are you coming back?” In these conversations, the 
critique of top-down development was barely present and instead we 
were told that the return of the Israelis would be greeted by residents by 
“dancing in the streets.”2 The warm embrace we received and the ro-
manticised recollections of the collapsed schemes we recorded were thus 
poignant testimony to the complexities of project afterlife. The legacy of 
the former schemes that emerged during our visit to the former moshavim 
was grounded in both the history of demise, downturn, and stagnation 
on the one hand and aspirations for new opportunities on the other. 
From our very first interactions with current residents, it was clear 
that there is a widespread collective memory of the schemes. Upon arri-
val at the Kafubu Block, we approached the first house that we saw and 
2 Interview, Mela Muyeke, Luanshya, 12 September 2015. 
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asked the young woman who was hanging her laundry outside if she 
knew someone in the village who might be able to provide us with in-
formation about the history of the place (without specifying what infor-
mation exactly we were looking for). The woman immediately called out 
to another member of the household, explaining that “they are looking 
for information about the Israelite period.” Indeed, at both sites we were 
repeatedly struck by the prominence of what came to be known by the 
community as “the time of the Israelites.” It seemed that everyone we 
spoke to knew about the “Israelite” origins of the settlements, and the 
presence of the Israelis had taken on almost mythological proportions. 
Former settlers with whom we spoke did not question the idea of 
implanting an Israeli development model in the Zambian countryside, 
and instead claimed that the schemes failed because the Israelis were 
given insufficient time to make them sustainable. As one former resident 
explained: 
The people were very disturbed and upset to hear that the Israel-
ites were leaving, because they had only stayed with them only for 
a short period of time. The Israelites arrived there in 1968, mean-
ing to organise and set a firm foundation for their projects, [but it] 
took time, so when everyone was trying to grasp the concept, it 
was announced that the Israelites were supposed to leave. This to 
the people was a setback.3 
Among former moshav settlers, recollections of the projects themselves 
were almost universally positive. Descriptions of the schemes revealed a 
sense that they had brought good fortune, as well as order, justice, equal-
ity, and modernity to the area. The projects, we were told, had an excel-
lent reputation and those who participated in them felt chosen:  
We were different, we who came into the project area were very 
happy because we had money coming in and good standards of 
living. Some people wanted to come but the project area was small 
to accommodate everyone, otherwise all people wanted to come 
here.4  
Another former participant praised the orderly manner in which the 
community was organised, hinting that the schemes emanated a kind of 
social and economic justice: “These people had a very good plan. These 
houses were built in the same manner and in lines.”5 Among some, the 
3 Interview, Albert Chabala, Kafubu, 13 September 2015. 
4 Interview, Albert Chabala, Kafubu, 13 September 2015. 
5 Interview, John Bupe, Kafubu, 13 September 2015. 
 20 Lynn Schler and Yonatan N. Gez 
romanticisation of the period became associated with Christian convic-
tions and evolved into a sense of divine intervention. As one man de-
scribed the feeling in his village at the start of the project:  
When they heard the Israelis were coming, they were very happy 
because they believed that they were coming from heaven. So the 
people wanted to see what the children of God would do for 
them, and they were so happy to have them.6 
Many interviewees described the equality that was introduced via the 
schemes, noting that the Israelis brought with them a just division of 
resources: “It was a nice thing because we received equal treatment, 
equal plots, and equal houses.”7 One former participant recalled the 
even-handedness that guided the allocation of land: “The Israelites ar-
gued that it would be unfair for others to get more as they would pro-
duce more than others.” Continuing, he added that such an egalitarian 
approach was considered innovative as:  
Here each person got the same share, as opposed to a traditional 
village in which people acquired land according to strength or cus-
tomary land tenure system.8 
The moshav model, we were told, created a new social reality in which all 
were made equal. The role of ethnicity was marginalised, meanwhile, in 
the face of a common new national mission: 
From the time Zambia got independence, the concept was to have 
one country not to be divided by ethnic groups but just have one 
country, one people. So, the people who came here [were] mostly 
composed of ex-miners, ex-civic servants, people who didn’t even 
work but wanted to settle on their own. They came here, they did 
not mind which tribe they belonged to.9 
The overall sentiment among the former moshav settlers was that mod-
ernity had been introduced to the region, and had it remained among 
them, life would have been far better today. Again and again, our inter-
viewees echoed the language of development and modernisation, em-
phasising progress and growth – and, according to several former set-
tlers, a much-desired shift from the status of “village” to that of “town”:  
6 Interview, Paterson Chikwanda, Kafulafuta, 14 September 2015. 
7 Interview, Paterson Chikwanda, Kafulafuta, 14 September 2015.  
8 Interview, Moses Mwale, Kafubu, 16 September 2015. 
9 Interview, John Bupe, Kafubu, 13 September 2015. 
 Development Shadows 21 
Everything was good, piggery, eggs, poultry, layers, et cetera. We 
were living as though we were in town, we were living a good life, 
not as we are now. And if the Israelis hadn’t left, this place would 
be a town by now. There was nothing bad; everything was good.10  
Another interviewee echoed this belief that the schemes would have 
brought “progress,” when she described how she believed things could 
have turned out:  
By now we would have already gained middle-class earning capaci-
ty, […] yes, we would be exporting organic vegetables to Israel 
and other places by now!11 
Conversely, the ending of the idealised, hopeful “present future” 
(Luhmann 1982; Hänsch, Kroeker, and Oldenburg 2017) was presented 
by our interviewees as the undoing of progress and a backward turn:  
The standard of living went down, there were no more loans, no 
incentives for our farming. We went back again to the way we 
were doing it before the cooperatives started. I went to the village 
and started tilling land using a hoe, our traditional farming. […] 
Water was pumped from boreholes when the Israelis were here, 
but when they left, water was not being pumped from the river 
and people had to go back to where there was water.12 
Someone else gave voice to the sense of stagnation that afflicted the 
community, and indeed the country more broadly: 
What these people [the Israelis] did, what they would have done 
for this nation if they had lived, because many people would not 
have been dying in poverty. This country would have been 
properly done with food. […] All the years they spent as they were 
away was a graveyard for us, we were dead, and their absence 
killed the communities where they started the projects.13  
This bleak description captures the moshav settlers’ frustration with the 
dismantling of the project, as a tremendous setback for the community. 
Interviewees told us how the project’s demise was followed by social 
breakdown and despair. One former scheme participant described the 
corruption of those leaders who exploited the Israelis’ departure to take 
control over resources:  
10 Interview, Paterson Chikwanda, Kafulafuta, 14 September 2015. 
11 Interview, Mela Muyeke, Luanshya, 12 September 2015.  
12 Interview, Paterson Chikwanda, Kafulafuta, 14 September 2015. 
13 Interview, Mela Muyeke, Luanshya, 12 September 2015. 
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To tell you the truth, the Israelis are too good. What happened 
was, they left a lot of money, the Israelis. They invested in, you 
know where we are getting feed for our pigs, feed for chicken. 
[…] Now when these people left, some of the people were happy, 
the leaders, they knew that they would get a lot of these things in-
cluding money. […] When the Israelites had left, it was just each 
one for himself and God for us all.14 
This last phrase was used again and again to describe the collapse of 
collective solidarity and the moral decay that followed the Israelis’ depar-
ture. Selfishness and greed, we were told, took over the community, and 
the self-serving vandalism of public property became rife. Some stole 
pipes and scraps of metal to eke out new sources of income, while others 
were blamed for having annexed large swaths of land from those who 
left in despair: 
You see, what had happened was, when the Israelites left, the so-
called communal land was disbanded. […] Each one for himself 
and God for us all, and those who were in the leadership had 
more land than others who were just ordinary people. That is how 
you find that there were some disparities, some people had six 
hectares, and others ten hectares, and some people were given 
more than 20 hectares, and so on.15 
A symbol of this turn to self-reliance and self-provision was the case of 
water sources. As we were told, “now everyone has to dig their own 
well.”16 The same interviewee went on to bemoan the sharp turn to 
individualism and self-interest in the period following the disbandment 
of the projects, and the erosion of interpersonal trust: 
Now, [after the project ended] if individuals, because of selfish-
ness, because of this animal in man, greedy, if individuals now 
were left to say go and sell, he could even say I carried 15 chick-
ens, five of them died on the road, while the story was different. 
So all that brought loss as it were. The tempo was lost, the spirit 
of [being] hardworking, it was lost. Because people were not hon-
est to themselves.17 
For some, the end of the Israeli schemes was emblematic of what went 
wrong in Zambia as a whole following the national downturn; the nos-
14 Interview, Best Nsama Yombwe, Kafubu, 13 September 2015. 
15 Interview, Best Nsama Yombwe, Kafubu, 13 September 2015. 
16 Interview, Best Nsama Yombwe, Kafubu, 13 September 2015. 
17 Interview, Best Nsama Yombwe, Kafubu, 13 September 2015. 
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talgia for the Israeli era was linked to the lack of opportunities that has 
plagued these communities ever since the economic decline of the 1970s. 
Moving Forward and the Moshavim Legacy
Patience Mususa’s work on the coping strategies of Copperbelt residents 
in the decades following the economic decline cautions us against seeing 
only disempowered victims. She argues that the economic crises have 
also given birth to creative energies and new kinds of strategy for devis-
ing a better future (Mususa 2010: 391). Similarly, we found that while the 
legacy of the moshav schemes offers a sombre reminder of personal, 
communal, and national disappointments, it has also served as a source 
of inspiration for new social and economic initiatives. Our interviewees 
evoked the schemes’ former success as evidence that prosperity, justice, 
and equality are indeed attainable in the Kafubu Block and Kafulafuta. 
Thus the collective memory around the moshav schemes was not only a 
vehicle for critiquing the past and the present, but also a means of pre-
serving and remarshalling ambitious visions of the future. Particularly 
with regard to cooperatives, the past has been mobilised by some mem-
bers of the community to advance forward-looking aspirations.  
This notion that the successes of the past could be revived once 
more was apparent in the way in which the local community welcomed 
our arrival. Although we had not prearranged our visit, the sudden ap-
pearance of two Israelis quickly became a source of speculation regard-
ing the possible renewal of the Israeli-led schemes. This was evident in 
individual and group excitement, enthusiastic exchanges of greetings and 
handshakes, invitations to people’s homes, and – as mentioned earlier – 
the recurring question: “Are you coming back?” Interviewees all at-
tempted to glean more information about “our” “actual” work plan. It 
did not matter how profusely we insisted that we are academics who in 
no way represent Israel’s aid agency, MASHAV; for our interviewees, 
our visit rekindled hopes for a return to a time of massive investment 
and visionary planning.  
In meetings with community leaders, cooperative organisations, and 
private individuals, we were presented with detailed requests for renewed 
assistance. These entreaties were evidence that the community still draws 
inspiration from the memory of the moshav schemes, and quickly mobil-
ised around the possibility of their revival. Moreover the content of the 
wish lists presented to us in these meetings revealed that the moshav 
schemes’ success continues to provide a vision of prosperity and a 
roadmap for moving forward, albeit adapted to current circumstances. 
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One interviewee thus gave an itemised list of requests, revealing a clear 
assessment of what was most needed in the community to achieve long-
term prosperity: 
If they [the Israelis] can help us with soya beans, which are in high 
demand, and sorghum, maize, millet, cassava, then it would even 
help the locals to eat the food which is more healthy – and there 
would be no talking of drought. […] The government can’t help 
us because they have no money. So if they [the Israelis] came it 
would be a blessing that they consider crops first. Chickens have 
also become expensive, but we are more interested in the crops 
now. We want them [the Israelis] back, they can bring the crops 
and they can help us to increase the food capacity in [our] homes 
because those crops last long as for food in the family.18 
In a series of meetings, we met with members of the Twashuka Women’s 
Cooperative. The group was founded in 1995 by women in the Kafubu 
Block who arranged to pool their resources and create a network of 
support to overcome poverty. They began with chicken farming, but 
eventually moved into dairy with the help of Heifer International. From 
its modest origins, the Twashuka Cooperative eventually grew to own 
325 cows shared by 35 women. While the group was enjoying relative 
success, they were still facing many challenges – and our visit was imme-
diately leveraged by the group. The cooperative leadership organised a 
members’ meeting in the abandoned hangar built by the Israelis in the 
former regional centre (Figure 2 above). After introductions that includ-
ed songs, prayers, and speeches, the group’s chairwoman rose to present 
us with a list of projects that could be undertaken by the Israelis should 
they return. The proposals ranged from small-scale initiatives such as 
proving bicycles to families in the community to more ambitious de-
mands such as building a paved road to the settlement. The cooperative 
leader drew a direct link between the history of the Israeli moshav in help-
ing Kaunda deliver on his promise of “one egg a day” and claimed, “we 
would like for this system to come back or be resumed.” That with one 
small modification, however:  
We are milking, and we have a lot of milk at the moment. When 
your people were here at first, we heard that there were eggs here, 
18 Interview, Paterson Chikwanda, Kafulafuta, 14 September 2015. 
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but now we have milk and as such it is milk every day; a glass of 
milk every day.19 
The chairwoman’s most ambitious proposal was for the Israelis to come 
back and build a system of canals around the Kafubu Block and Kafula-
futa, helping bring water closer to the area’s farmland and provide an-
other mode of transportation too. Realising that this was a grandiose 
vision, she added – echoing both biblical and modern times – that:  
It is only the Israelites that have done wonders in the desert as 
such; it is only them that can help to end the perpetual suffering 
of the women in the area.20  
The women’s detailed solicitation for renewed Israeli assistance was an 
illustration of agency inspired by the memory of the past, but it also 
indicated that the local community believed it has a role to play in de-
signing the future. Far from the top-down modernisation strategy of the 
1960s, our interlocutors signalled to us that an eventual return for the 
purpose of project renewal would have to be based on local participa-
tion, and incorporate the perspectives, aspirations, and needs of the 
community from the very start. 
Conclusion
Forty-five years after the demise of the two Israeli-led moshav schemes in 
the Zambian Copperbelt, the communities who continue to inhabit the 
project sites are well aware of the past – and they leverage it both to 
make sense of the present and to dream of the future. To them, the 
projects and their promises remain an ontological reality, present both 
physically and mentally in ways that the original planners could not have 
foreseen. Long after the schemes were dismantled, their legacy endures 
for the former project participants still living on-site. Though an ongoing 
reminder of economic decline, shattered dreams, and stagnation, the 
project’s short-lived success remains a source of pride and possibility for 
the community. The local population continues to draw upon memories 
of the projects at significant junctures, and demonstrates that despite 
their collapse – or, more precisely, because of it – the multifaceted im-
pact on the society is still ongoing. 
19 Chairwoman of the Twashuka’s women’s cooperative, speech to the whole 
cooperative in honor of our visit, Kafubu, 15 September 2015. 
20 Chairwoman of the Twashuka’s women’s cooperative, speech to the whole 
cooperative in honor of our visit, Kafubu, 15 September 2015. 
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Thus, this case study demonstrates how – when seen from the van-
tage point of the longue durée – development is replete with unintended 
consequences and evolving impacts. As we expand our gaze to capture 
the unexpected uses and reuses of the material of development in ways 
that far outlive their original intention and time frame, we gain a whole 
new perspective on success, failure, and sustainability. While the moshav 
schemes emerged as a temporary success after their founding in 1967, 
and then experienced a swift reversal and abandonment by 1973, the 
projects’ afterlife over the long term blurs the distinction between suc-
cess and failure. Instead, the examination of development’s afterlife en-
courage us to see how legacies are time-bound and continually open to 
new layers and interpretations. We are reminded whose reality counts 
when the Twashuka Women’s Cooperative extends an invitation to the 
Israelis to come back. Their appeal is part of an ongoing effort within 
the community to remake and reclaim the projects’ remains in ways that 
are useful to them.  
As research within the field of development studies tends towards 
short-term research and assumptions about organisational survival and 
continuity (Schuller 2007), we believe scholars should adopt historical 
and long-term perspectives on the unfolding of development projects – 
and thus follow the traces of development’s (unintended) consequences 
far beyond formal project trajectories and time frames. Such a perspec-
tive can help us to better understand the impact of project planning and 
outcomes, and further sensitise us to the ways in which communities 
continue to debate the strategies and practices of development long after 
planners have exited the stage. The view of the longue durée in the study of 
development can thus provide important perspectives on questions of 
impact and sustainability. Just as importantly, such work can draw atten-
tion to the actual agency of project recipients as they engage in a brico-
lage-like recomposition – using the remains of former projects to form 
new and relevant solutions in response to changing circumstances and 
needs. The story of the “creative effervescence [that] sprouted from 
development’s ‘failures’” (Goldman 2008: 37) should consider all catego-
ries of stakeholders – and not least, the people most affected by such 
interventions. 
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Entwicklungsschatten: Das Leben nach dem Zusammenbruch von 
Entwicklungsprojekten im Kupfergürtel von Sambia 
 
Zusammenfassung: Gemeinschaften, die früher das Ziel postkolonialer 
Entwicklungsprogramme waren, kämpfen auch noch lange nach dem 
Ende der Programme mit den Altlasten. In diesem Artikel wird das Nach-
leben landwirtschaftlicher Genossenschaften im Kupfergürtel von Sam-
bia beschrieben, die in den 1960er-Jahren von Israel ins Leben gerufen 
wurden. Obwohl die Programme bereits im darauffolgenden Jahrzehnt 
scheiterten, bewältigen lokale Gemeinschaften die Geschichte des Auf-
stiegs und Falls der Programme noch immer nicht. In Kafubu Block und 
Kafulafuta hallen die Erfolge und Misserfolge dieser Planungen der Mo-
derne noch heute in der physischen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Um-
gebung nach. Die Programme sind nach wie vor ein wesentlicher und 
umstrittener Bezugspunkt im individuellen und gemeinschaftlichen Le-
ben. Eine langfristige Betrachtung der fortgesetzten Auseinandersetzung 
der Gemeinschaften mit dem Erbe der aufgegebenen Entwicklungspro-
jekte verstärkt unser Verständnis des komplexen „Nachlebens“ und 
zeigt, wie die Vergangenheit ihre Relevanz behält, indem sie im Laufe der 
Zeit unterschiedliche Bedeutungen annimmt. 
 
Schlagwörter: Sambia, Entwicklung, Vermächtnis, Genossenschaften, 
moderne Planung, Moshav 
 
